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Learning, radical uncertainty, and a state of exception
Fiscal policy is the sum of decisions on taxation and spending that one takes 
in an economy, particularly in times of crisis. As such, it is of existential im-
portance in the life of a society. Known for its recent waves of spending cuts 
and tax increases (austerity) during recessions (Blyth, 2013), 2020 Europe 
has had a more expansionary fiscal policy than ever before. How do we make 
sense of this shift? To answer this question, let us draw on select insights from 
three political economy literatures on fiscal crisis management. The first is the 
literature on learning. For its proponents, changes in fiscal policy are powered 
by evidence-based, yet politically mediated cognitive updating in the corri-
dors of power. Plainly put, policymakers are keen students of what changes 
in their environment. This literature has showed that a great deal of learning 
took place in the EU since 2010 in particular (Schmidt, 2020; Kahkhaji and 
Radaelli, 2017; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2019). Its main implication for fiscal 
policy under corona is that between 2010 and 2015 the EU leaders learned 
about the limits of austerity and the virtues of more spending and tax cuts in a 
recession. Consequently, one would expect that when a deep recession arrives 
again (and it did in the spring of 2020), they would not be tempted to do a 
rerun of the self-defeating policies of the 2010-2012 period. As Keynes put it, 
“when the facts change, I change my mind.”
The second literature the paper takes inspiration from dwells on the role of 
economic ideas in policy in moments when radical uncertainty reigns, that 
is when no one can precisely calculate the risk attached to certain courses of 
action versus others (Blyth, 2001; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2020). For these 
scholars, such moments of uncertainty open up the doors for radically new 
ideas to enter the specter of policy possibilities. For example, Keynesian ideas 
shaped policy during the Great Depression in countries as different as the US 
and Sweden because both the state and capital had quickly ran out of conven-
tional choices and were thoroughly uncertain about what to do next (Blyth, 
2001). Yet what makes the Covid crisis peculiar is that it was not only a crisis 
of radical uncertainty. Indeed, unlike in the Great Depression, when orthodox 
ideas were tried first, this was a particular form of radical uncertainty: one 
where most policymakers converged on operating with a doomsday scenario 
of a catastrophic and sudden stop in consumption, trade, finance and invest-
ment. The usual politics of scapegoating some countries and lionizing others 
due to their fiscal policy situation (Matthijs and McNamara, 2015) took a back 
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seat everywhere in Europe as long as these fears persisted (March-June 2020). 
It is into this unique gap and under aura of emergency that radical forms of 
“emergency Keynesianism” familiar since 2008-2009 (Bremer and McDaniel, 
2019) could walk in.
Yet in a complex multi-level polity with unevenly situated national economies 
such as the EU, not all policy ideas are equal. The third strand of literature 
I draw on is the EU crisis governance scholarship that emphasizes coordi-
nation between the representatives of the EU member states at the expense 
of the EU’s supranational technocracy. Some called this “intergovernmental 
domination” (Fabbrini, 2016) and identified it as the main locus of power in 
the EU since 2010, with the domestic politics of the surplus/creditor coun-
tries filtering what ideas and policies could be adopted at the EU level (Mat-
thijs, 2016; Bremer and McDaniel, 2019; Bremer, 2020; Redeker and Walter, 
2020; see Schild, (2020) for a skeptical view). The simplified implication of 
this literature is that the fiscal ideas with which to reduce systemic uncertainty 
stand to be not any ideas learned from the previous fiscal crisis, but only those 
that are also aligned with the interests of dominant actors in these strongly 
positioned countries. This line of thinking invites the following hypothesis: 
while emergency Keynesianism was deployed at the national level in the EU 
between 2008 and 2009, the fact that the doomsday scenario associated with 
Covid gripped the decision-making processes of both the surplus and deficit 
countries1 during corona meant that Keynesianism could be scaled up from 
the national to the EU level.
Learning from the last war
Learning is relatively rare in economic policy (Oliver, 2016; Kahkhaji and 
Radaelli, 2017; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2019) and it is not unusual for power-
ful actors such as the German government or the European Central Bank to 
(rationally) learn the wrong lessons (Matthijs and Blyth, 2018). But between 
2011 and 2015 the failure of the strategy to cut one’s way out of the recession 
induced by the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 had become manifest at the 
level of the EU (Ban, 2020; Schelkle, 2016; Schmidt, 2020). Far from enjoy-
ing some privilege, government bond markets in the Eurozone appeared to 
be fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in stan-
dalone countries with a national currency. To illustrate, low debt Spain almost 
went bankrupt (Blyth, 2013) and high debt UK and Hungary did fine in the 
bond markets (de Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Ban and Bohle, 2020). The main rea-
son for this divergence was the ECB’s reluctance to act as lender to all gov-
ernments in the Eurozone (“lender of last resort”) in the early years of the 
crisis (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013), in contrast to the central banks of the UK or 
Hungary (Ban and Gabor, 2016; Ban, 2020). 
Back in 2010-2012, important European politicians and technocrats pro-
claimed that fiscal austerity was needed to cut public debt and make the econ-
omy grow again (Blyth, 2013; Helgadottir, 2016). Indeed, it was not until the 
18
Temanummer: Coronakrisen i samfundsperspektiv
SAMFUNDSØKONOMEN 4/2020 Udgives af Djøf Forlag
ECB stepped in to “do whatever it takes” to defend government debt through-
out the Eurozone and the heads of the member states established the European 
Stability Mechanism (a kind of bailout fund) that the Eurozone got something 
close to a lender of last resort function (Howarth and Spendzharova, 2019; 
Gabor and Ban, 2016; Gabor, 2016). European elites also became concerned 
with the fall in credit to the “real economy” despite bank bailouts and deeper 
public spending cuts. As a result, they asked the bank of the EU (the European 
Investment Bank) to ramp up credit and even created a new European public 
lender (the so-called Juncker Plan) in order to lend to projects too risky for 
the EIB and more tailored for small and medium firms in Europe (Quaglia, 
2017; Schmidt, 2020). 
This backdrop of the 2008-2012 crisis in Europe is important for an analysis 
of fiscal policy during Covid in the European Union (EU). Thus, for all their 
differences, both the technocrats in Brussels or Frankfurt and the national 
heads of state had been primed for reading another major recession (such as 
the Covid recession) with different lenses than the ones of 2010-2012, when 
austerity had been the norm. However, as the next section shows, to the extent 
that the EU-level management of the 2010-2012 crisis was deeply anchored 
into the national politics of the surplus countries (Germany, Holland, etc.) 
(Puetter, 2016; Schimmelfennig, 2018; Smeets and Beech, 2020; Carstensen 
and Schmidt, 2020), the Covid crisis and the emerging “emergency Keynes-
ian” policy response made a Keynesian fiscal stimulus and supporting mon-
etary stimulus unavoidable because this time around the surplus countries 
started at economic catastrophe as well. 
A crisis like no other and the importance of having supportive  
central bankers
In March 2020, both the European Commission and the International Mon-
etary Fund expected most advanced economies to enter the most severe re-
cession since the Great Depression. At the time of writing this study, that fear 
seems to have been exaggerated, yet the fear of coordinated financial and 
fiscal collapses in the EU had been widespread in the spring of 2020. This 
“end of times” atmosphere, complete with the harshest lockdowns in mod-
ern memory, precipitated European economies, almost overnight, into war 
economy conditions. That “war economy” was not a journalistic hyperbole 
was demonstrated by its use by elite names as different as UN head Antonio 
Guterres,2 French President Emmanuel Macron,3 Spanish prime minister Pe-
dro Sanchez4 or former ECB chairman Mario Draghi.5 And war it felt like. 
The collapse of aggregate demand and international trade, as well as a sharp 
drop in the GDP of OECD countries, created panic across Europe. According 
to a recent estimate, the global economy shrank 7.8% in the second quarter of 
2020. In the Euro area, the corresponding figure was 12 percent,6 an unprece-
dented drop in peace time (OECD 2020). It was at this juncture in the spring 
of 2020 that Eurogroup President Mario Centeno junked “peacetime” moral 
hazard considerations and stated that,
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“The challenge our economies are facing today is in no way similar to 
the previous crisis. This is a symmetric external shock. Moral hazard 
considerations are not warranted here. We must bear this in mind when 
we consider coronavirus dedicated instruments.” 
From a strictly fiscal policy standpoint, it was a crisis like no other because of 
anticipated disruptions affecting both supply and demand across Europe’s na-
tional economies (Guerrieri et al., 2020). This sense of extreme disruption led 
to the fast adoption of unprecedented containment policies based on the un-
orthodox coordination of monetary and fiscal responses. If conventional pol-
icy assigns virtues to monetary policy alone and is skeptical of fiscal stimulus 
as self-defeating (Ban, 2015), the lessons of the 2008-2012 crisis had softened 
this approach. Indeed, the ECB and other European central banks adopted 
bold and unprecedented forms of financial stabilization and support for gov-
ernment debt in the bond markets. 
The Covid crisis also introduced coordinated monetary, financial and fiscal 
stimulus that had been redolent of the golden age of Keynesianism. As “mas-
ter of the European masters of the universe”, to paraphrase Diessner and Lisi 
(2019), the ECB unleashed bond buying programs to stabilize markets to an 
even wider spectrum of activities, with its rates running close to zero. On 
March 18th, 2020, the ECB launched the 750 billion Euro Pandemic Emer-
gency Purchase Program (PEPP) aimed at national and regional government 
bonds as well as private sector bonds. Contrary to conventional expectations, 
the main beneficiaries were not predominantly “periphery” countries but an 
assortment of deficit and surplus economies: Belgium, France, Germany, It-
aly, Netherlands, and Spain. Less than three months later, on June 4, 2020, 
the ECB nearly doubled the PEPP (to 1350 billion Euros) and made bond 
purchases aiming to remove the uncertainty over whether ECB purchases will 
continue throughout the cycles of the health crisis. In total, PEPP increased 
the ECB’s balance sheet to half the pre-COVID GDP in the Euro area, making 
it twice as big as the Fed’s in terms of its GDP ratio. If Adam Tooze (2018) was 
right that the Fed did better than the more conservative ECB in the previous 
crisis, the same cannot be said about the COVID crisis. 
Arguably, the sudden stop of large volumes of economic activities triggered by 
the COVID shock led to the emergence of “COVID dominance” – whereby 
“nations focused monetary and fiscal policies on mitigating and containing 
the adverse health and economic consequences of the pandemic” (Jinjarak et 
al., 2020). Simultaneously with PEPP, the EU member states launched large 
national fiscal stimulus packages to mitigate widespread fears of the worst 
outcome: collapsing household and corporate income at times of massive 
medical and policy effort to deal with the new highly contagious pandemic. 
The COVID-19 Financial Response Tracker mapped out these measures in 
detail, so it makes little sense to provide a stylized narrative here. Yet it suffices 
to note that the menu was not entirely part of the typical pre-COVID fiscal 
policy answer. In addition to conventional tax holidays and credit/grants to 
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firms familiar before 2020, governments also began owning large parts of the 
affected sectors and paid in part or in full the wages of the workforce forced to 
stay at home at the cost of public debt going up 15 percentage point of GDP 
across the OECD (OECD, 2020). 
Critically, COVID did not affect just the fiscally fragile Mediterranean coun-
tries. It also affected the fiscally strong Northern and Central European 
countries. In line with the hypothesis on intergovernmentalism, this situa-
tion changed the political economy of crisis management at the EU level. For 
example, the core industries of the creditor countries (automotive,7 aircraft 
manufacturing, machinery)8 saw unprecedented damage,9 triggering tempo-
rary sudden stops across the supply and value chains. Even in an economy as 
strong as Germany’s, strategic exports shrunk drastically (figure 1). 
Figure 1: Germany’s product export growth
Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/deu
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A business survey of German, Spanish and Austrian  firms in the industry, 
service, retail trade, and construction sectors  found that the overwhelming 
majority expect a negative impact of the corona-crisis on annual turnover (to 
the tune of 20% in Germany and Austria and 25-44% in Spain).10 These are 
sectors with political influence via both labor and employer interests (Cul-
pepper, 2010). Their interests could only be served by policies anchored in a 
bold fiscal stimulus.11 Without supportive measures (including bailouts) from 
the state, the writing was on the wall for this sectors of systemic importance 
(Lonegran and Blyth, 2020).12
We know from a vast literature that fiscal policy decisions are as good as the 
trust of the bond markets. Here, EU technocrats and national leaders seem to 
have remembered how quickly deteriorating market conditions for govern-
ment debt are followed by deteriorating market conditions for corporate debt 
(Gabor and Ban, 2016). In this regard, we now have emerging evidence that 
the implementation of the PEPP prevented runs on sovereign and corporate 
debt, thereby freeing and funding resources needed to fight the medical and 
economic consequences of the pandemic (Jinjarak et al., 2020). 
Pass the fiscal bazooka
It is against this background that the EU institutions embraced emergency 
Keynesianism at the EU level and in the area of fiscal interventions as well. 
As early as March 20, the Commission proposed to activate the general es-
cape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).13 The clause was then 
embedded into “Six-Pack” reform of the SGP, and granted the Member States 
the possibility to deal with the fallout from the health crisis by suspending 
the obligation to adopt austerity for countries failing the fiscal targets agreed 
at the EU level (no deficit in excess of 3 percent of GDP). The Commission 
also modified EU State Aid rules to make them more flexible especially for 
critical sectors such as aviation and tourism. Furthermore, with the Recovery 
Plan for Europe, the European Commission increased expenditure ceilings, 
granted additional access to emergency loans and assets for member states, 
while earmarking funding for the health and agricultural sectors.14 The EIB 
(European Investment Bank) was asked to provide support as well by extend-
ing loans to companies for up to 200 billion euros, with a focus on financing 
capital investment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) especially after 
the initial phases of the pandemic and a temporary loan-based instrument 
(SURE, for State Supported Short-time work or reduced work) of up to 100 
billion euros to reduce unemployment by protecting workers and jobs. As fig-
ure 2 shows, despite a greater contraction of the GDP compared to 2008-2009, 
the EU experienced a less pronounced increase in unemployment numbers 
during COVID.
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Figure 2: Average unemploymet rate in the European Union
Source: Eurostat
Subsequently, following the collapse of talks over “coronabonds” (collective 
debt issuance to reduce the interest rate for the fiscally weaker countries), a 
coordinated EU-wide fiscal package became a reality hard to envisage in Feb-
ruary 2020: credit lines provided of the European Stability Mechanism, the 
EU’s bailout fund established in 2013 in reaction to the failures of the sover-
eign debt crisis of 2010-2013; a countercyclical ‘recovery fund’ or “European 
Marshall Plan” (“Next Generation EU” (NGEU)) – worth 750 billion euros 
readied to jumpstart European economies. The fact that this EU-level stim-
ulus comes in the form of grants makes it doubly special. To top it off, the 
composition of the NGEU was not vintage Keynesianism, but what can be 
termed “green and digital Keynesianism”, with climate change and digitali-
zation looming large among the priorities. At the time of writing this article, 
the member states are expected to submit draft recovery and resilience plans 
outlining national investment priorities in line with this approach.15 National 
objections to this fiscal solidarity reemerged in the later stages of the health 
crisis, with the “frugal four demanding rebates, stable contributions to the EU 
budget, climate change budgetary earmarks and conditions attached to the 
implementation of the stimulus package.”16 But one should not miss the forest 
from the trees. These objections merely dented the emerging countercyclical 
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policy rather than destroy it. At the end of the day, the fact that Germany, the 
creditor/surplus country with fiscally conservative preferences, supported the 
EU-wide stimulus package locked in emergency Keynesianism and made a 
repeat of the 2010-2012 impossible. 
Is this a Hamiltonian moment in European fiscal policy?
Recent research on fiscal policy during Corona howed that had the govern-
ment not provided wage support, local consumption would have declined by 
44 percent in advanced economy settings (Casado et al 2020). Since consump-
tion is a large part of GDP, the Corona recession would have been a lot more 
brutal. Supported by central banks’ extraordinary interventions, governments 
prevented this from happening. Moreover, the EU developed a stronger fiscal 
arm backed by monetary and financial policy interventions at the EU level, 
with significant levels of citizen support for them (Beetsma et al., 2020). Yet 
what exactly should we make of it? Is this a form of emerging fiscal federal-
ism, a United States of Europe in infancy? The scope of this transformation of 
fiscal policy at the EU level should be interpreted with caution. Three caveats 
stand out in this regard.
First, as the largest fiscal instrument of these transformations, NextGen is not 
really the fiscal foundation of a European federalism. Indeed, it is merely a 
form of fiscal crisis management shaped by the cohabitation of “emergency 
Keynesianism,” “COVID fiscal dominance” (a rapid and sharply countercy-
clical mobilization of fiscal resources to fund the medical system, the sectors 
disrupted by the heath crisis and the workers put on furlough by it) and the 
advancement of pre-COVID EU reforms, with the third priority in quantita-
tive dominance. Thus,
“Looking at the proposed allocation of the funds, one finds that less than one-
tenth of the total (55 bn) should be ’allocated based on the severity of the 
socio-economic impacts of the crisis’ (under REACT-EU), which is presented 
as a top-up of current cohesion policy. The most important part of Next Gen-
eration EU is a new Recovery and Resilience Facility of €560 billion, whose 
purpose is to offer financial support for investments and reforms, including 
in relation to the green and digital transitions and the resilience of national 
economies, linking these to the EU priorities – but with no reference to the 
impact of shocks. The bulk of Next Generation EU should thus not be allo-
cated to help absorb a shock, but to provide financial support for investment 
linked to EU priorities.”17
Second, some elements of the “emergency Keynesianism” are set to auto-
matically expire with the end of the health crisis. Thus, the (unprecedented) 
suspension of the escape clause is not a generalized suspension of the deficit 
rules, which will return in full force after COVID. In this sense, the ministers 
of finance (Eurogroup) and the EU’s fiscal watchdog (European Fiscal Board) 
stressed that the suspension operates in a “timely, temporary and targeted” 
manner. 
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Third, macroeconomic models matter (Heimberger and Kappeller, 2017; 
Heimberger et al., 2019). The macroeconomic model used by the EU to judge 
the fiscal policy positions of the member states (the so called “PO model”) re-
mains unaltered. The problem with this model is that it tends to be more pes-
simistic and critical of those countries that are also forecast to suffer a larger 
decline in economic activity relative to the pre-COVID-19 levels. It also tends 
to suggest austerity in the worst of economic times. To avert this twin prob-
lem, the Commission needs to calibrate this model used in fiscal surveillance 
to provide countries with more fiscal leeway as they deal with the long-term 
effects of the COVID crisis (Heimberger, 2020). 
The emergence of a strong set of stimulus instruments at the EU level, the 
monetary support provided by the ECB and the deciseiveness with which the 
EU uses this crisis to address the climate crisis and Europe’s mediocre perfor-
mance in digital technologies, suggest that European elites have experienced 
an intense episode of lesson learning. However, its scope should not be over-
stated. First, the centerpiece of this new EU-level fiscal activism (NextGen) is 
a rather sluggish form of emergency Keynesianism, with its implementation 
still waiting for coordinated domestic action. Second, and perhaps most im-
portantly, shocks of this kind to both supply and demand, shocks that come 
accompanied by sense of radical uncertainty that bring policymakers and 
public in “war economy” mode are extremely rare (indeed “black swan”-like) 
events. As such, their consequences tend to peter out, ushering business as 
usual once the initial radical uncertainty is replaced by calculable risk about 
the potential courses of action. If the other “emergency Keynesianism” epito-
mized by the 2008-2010 crisis serves any lesson, it is that once the emergency 
is over, the EU may rationally learn the wrong lessons. Rationally learning 
the good lessons, not the wrong ones (Blyth and Matthijs, 2019), seems to 
be the contingent blessing of traumatic moments such as the one we are still 
experiencing.
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Noter
1. Northern countries were less affected than the Southern ones (Gräbner et al., 2020) 





















13. Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of Regulation No. 1466/97 and Articles 3(5) and 5(2)  
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